Making education markets through global trade agreements by Robertson, Susan Lee
 1 
Making	Education	Markets	Through	Global	Trade	Agreements	(forthcoming	 in	 Globalisation,	 Societies	 and	 Education,	 15	 (3),	 Special	 Issue	 on	‘Making	Education	Markets	and	Trade’			
Susan	L.	Robertson	University	of	Cambridge,	UK	slr69@cam.ac.uk		
Abstract		This	 paper	 uses	 the	 global	 trade	 negotiations	 and	 agreements,	 which	 include	education	sectors	as	potentially	tradeable	services,	to	show	the	complex	processes	at	work	in	making	global	education	markets.		Drawing	on	the	work	of	Jens	Beckert	and	 others,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 micro-processes	 of	 making	 capitalist	 orders,	 and	 the	challenges	 at	 hand	 in	 bringing	 decommodified	 sectors,	 like	 education,	 with	distinctly	 different	 narratives	 to	 sustain	 their	 purpose.	 	 These	 processes	 include	reimagining	and	offering	alternative	narratives	to	the	idea	of	education	as	a	public	service;	 the	 reformatting	 the	 education	 into	 the	 language	 of	 trade	 and	 legal	documents;	the	use	of	devices,	such	as	forecasting	to	represent	the	gains	to	be	had	into	the	 future	of	 trade	agreements,	or	dispute	settlement	mechanisms	to	manage	claims;	 and	 the	 strategic	use	of	 space	and	 time	as	political	 resources	 to	minimize	frictions	and	lock	in	a	preferred	future	for	investors.		I	conclude	by	arguing	that	the	ongoing	 circulation	 of	 alternative	 narratives	 about	 education	 makes	 instituting	education	particularly	challenging,	so	that	the	future	for	investors	is	in	no	more	way	certain,	despite	efforts	to	reorient	expectations.				Keywords:	 Trade	 agreements,	 globalization,	 markets,	 neoliberalism,	 fictional	expectations,	capitalism						 	
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Introduction	
	In	 a	 widely	 cited	 report	 on	 the	 global	 value	 of	 the	 education	 sector	 –	 analysts	working	 for	 the	 Merrill	 Lynch	 Bank	 of	 America	 stated	 it	 was	 at	 the	 time	 worth	around	$4.5-5	trillion,	and	expected	to	grow	to	$6-8	trillion	by	2017	(Harnett	et	al.,	2014:	6).	In	anyone’s	language,	this	is	a	huge	figure.	Yet	as	the	contributors	to	this	special	 issue	 are	 all	 exploring	 in	 new	 and	 interesting	 ways,	 it	 is	 important	 to	remember	there	is	considerable	distance	between	asserting	the	dollar	value	of	the	sector	both	now	and	into	the	future,	and	the	wholesale	transformation	of	education	into	 a	 profit-producing	 enterprise	 on	 a	 grand	 scale.	 	 This	 is	 because	 framing	education	in	this	way,	embedding	it	in	institutions,	and	normalizing	education	as	a	sector	 for	 global	 investors,	 takes	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 cultural,	 political	 and	 economic	‘work’.		Much	of	this	work	entails	a	complex	set	of	processes:		reframing	education	so	as	to	give	 it	 a	 new	 meaning,	 formatting	 education	 in	 ways	 that	 are	 legible	 to	 trade	departments	 and	 investors;	 the	 creative	 use	 of	 devices	 –	 such	 as	 forecasting,	investment	advice	and	credit	to	make	markets	work;	embedding	new	market	logics	into	 institutional	 arrangements	 and	 their	 governance	 architectures	 to	 reproduce	markets;	and,	the	deployment	of	spatial	and	temporal	strategies	to	manage	frictions	and	 the	 inevitable	 contestation	 around	 the	 transformation	of	 a	 social	 good	 into	 a	commodity,	whose	taken-for-grantedness	is	yet	to	become	more	stable.			Global	 trade	 negotiations	 and	 agreements,	 for	 example,	 the	 World	 Trade	Organization’s	General	Agreement	on	Trade	in	Services,	and	the	recent	mega	trade	deals	such	as	the	Trans	Pacific	Partnership	(TPP)	and	the	Comprehensive	Economic	Trade	 Agreement	 (CETA),	 are	 particularly	 interesting	 entry	 points	 into	 studying	global	 education	markets.	 It	 is	 because	 here	we	 can	 see	 education	markets	 in	 the	
making	 through	 the	 unbundling	 of	 education	 as	 a	 public	 service,	 the	 reframing,	reformatting	and	standardizing	of	education	to	enable	 its	exchange	 in	 the	market,	
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and	 the	 deployment	 of	 various	 strategies	 and	 devices	 to	 institute	 and	 normalise	education	 as	 a	 global	 services	 sector	 governed	 through	 global	 trade	 rules.	 In	 this	paper	 I	 pay	 particular	 attention	 to	 these	 ongoing	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 privileging	 a	future	 that	 is	 controlled	by	 global	 investors.	 Theoretically,	 I	 draw	on	 the	work	of	Jens	Beckett	and	his	sociology	of	capitalism	in	that	he	pays	particular	attention	to	the	how,	or	the	micro-foundations,	of	making	capitalist	futures.	Methodologically	I	draw	upon	a	 range	of	publicly	 available	 and	 leaked	documents	on	 these	different	agreements,	 as	 well	 as	 secondary	 literatures	 on	 trade	 deals	 and	 their	 ongoing	negotiation.			
Making	Capitalist	Futures	–	A	Focus	on	Agents	and	Action			Any	argument	around	education,	and	 its	 inclusion	more	directly	 in	 the	process	of	capital	accumulation,	 suggests	 the	need	 to	 look	closely	at	not	only	capitalism	as	a	macro-socio-economic	 and	 political	 dynamic,	 but	 the	micro	 and	 detailed	ways	 in	which	micro-level	 social,	 spatial,	 and	 temporal	 ordering	 practices	 are	 engaged	 to	produce	new	cognitive	orientations	to	the	world.		In	short,	to	ask	Gramsci’s	(1971)	question:		how	do	actors	acquire	a	new	commonsense	around	the	role	of	education	in	society?	Jens	Beckert’s	focus	on	the	micro-foundations	of	capitalist	social	orders	is	 particularly	 helpful	 in	 answering	 this	 question.	 By	 micro-foundations	 Beckert	means	the	social	practices	or	actions	of	agents	whose	structurally-inscribed	agency	produces	 and	 reproduces	 capitalist	 social	 orders	 and	 futures	 (cf.	 Beckert,	 1996,	2014,	2016).			To	make	more	visible	 the	distinctive	of	 the	 temporal	 order	of	 capitalism,	Beckert	(2014:	3)	draws	attention	to	French	sociologist,	Pierre	Bourdieu,	and	his	accounts	of	 the	 Kabyle	 people	 in	 French-controlled	 Algeria.	 Bourdieu	 was	 particularly	interested	 in	 changes	 in	 temporal	 order	 within	 Kabylian	 society	 as	 a	 result	 of	capitalist	modernization	in	Algeria.	He	notes	how	the	social	and	temporal	logics	of	traditional	Kabylian	society,	of	solidarity	and	honour,	were	eventually	replaced	by	attitudes	toward	calculation	and	future	profits.	 	This	led	to	“…conflicts	in	Kabylian	
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society	triggered	by	different	forms	of	economic	thinking	and	new	practices	which	were	ultimately	destroying	the	traditional	social	order”	(op.	cit:	4).	The	main	point	to	 be	 derived	 from	 looking	 at	 the	 breakdown	 of	 a	 traditional	 society	 like	 this,	Beckert	 argues,	 is	 to	 “…highlight	 the	 shift	 in	 temporal	 orientation	 as	 being	 at	 the	heart	of	capitalism’s	unfolding	dynamic”	(ibid).		And	it	is	‘the	future’	and	the	role	it	plays	in	capitalist	dynamics	which	is	particularly	pertinent	to	this	analysis	of	making	markets	through	trade	agreements.	‘The	future’	in	capitalism	is	not	one	sided.	Modern	capitalist	societies	see	the	future	as	open	and	uncertain	 as	 well	 as	 a	 store-house	 of	 possibilities	 for	 future	 innovation	 and	investment.	This	in	turn	means	investing	in	efforts	to	manage	the	future,	as	well	as	how	to	exploit	 the	 future.	As	a	result;	 “…the	capitalist	economy	specifies	systemic	pressures	 that	 enforce	 a	 temporal	 orientation	 toward	 future	 economic	opportunities	 and	 risks.	 Only	 by	 examining	 these	 institutionalized	 pressures	may	we	 comprehensively	 shed	 light	 on	 the	 role	 of	 actors	 temporal	 orientations	 with	regard	to	economic	processes”		(Beckert,	2016:	3-4).		Two	 institutional	 mechanisms	 are	 identified	 by	 Beckert	 as	 key	 to	 enforcing	 the	future	orientation	of	actors	 in	capitalism:	that	of	competition,	and	credit	(Beckert,	2016:	 4).	 Competition	 forces	 actors	 to	 remain	 alert	 to	 threats,	 and	 to	 seek	 new	opportunities	 to	 overcome	 threats.	 Credit	 enables	 entrepreneurs	 and	 firms	 to	engage	 in	 economic	 activity	 that	 could	 not	 otherwise	 be	 undertaken,	 using	resources	they	have	yet	to	earn.	An	example	here	is	the	role	of	venture	capitalists	global	 financial	 institutions	 like	 the	 International	 Finance	 Corporation	 who	 have	provided	 credit	 to	 new	 education	 providers	 like	 Bridge	 International	 Academies	(see	Riep	in	this	issue)	to	open	new	education	markets	in	Africa.		Yet	despite	the	future	being	unknown,	actors	have	perceptions	of	the	social	world	and	develop	 expectations	 about	 the	 future	 that	 in	 turn	 influences	 their	 decisions.	But	 because	 these	 decisions	 cannot	 be	 ‘rational’	 (in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 rational	choice	 theorists	 think	 about	 future	 as	 predictable)	 in	 that,	 given	 the	 future	 is	unknown,	they	are	in	essence	‘fictional	expectations’.	All	they	can	do	is	provide	an	orientation	 in	 decision-making	 “…despite	 the	 incalculability	 of	 the	 outcomes”	
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(Beckert,	 2014:	 9).	 They	 are	 also	 ‘expectations’	 in	 that	 they	 are	 social	 and	 not	individual	 phenomena,	 and	 are	 shaped	 by	 collective	 beliefs	 formed	 from	communicative	practices	 ranging	 from	 laypeople	 to	 firms,	politicians,	 experts	 and	the	media,	and	are	crucial	in	the	formation	of	imagined	futures.	“Actors,	motivated	by	 an	 imaginary	 future	 state,	 organize	 their	 activities	 based	 on	 this	 mental	representation	and	the	emotions	associated	with	it”	(Beckert,	2016:	9).	As	a	result,	“in	 economic	 practice,	 fictional	 expectations	 take	 a	 narrative	 form,	 and	 become	articulated	as	stories	 that	 tell	how	the	 future	will	 look	and	how	the	economy	will	unfold	into	the	future	from	the	current	state	of	affairs”	(Beckert,	2016:	10).	These	stories	are	embedded	in	 frames,	which	 include	an	ensemble	of	economic	theories,	such	 as	 development,	 risk	 and	 calculation,	 or	 technological	 progress,	 and	 are	mediated	 through	 the	 deployment	 of	 a	 range	 of	 strategies	 and	 devices,	 such	 as	formatting	 tools,	 statistical	 trends,	 impact	 assessments,	 detailed	 and	 complicated	clauses	 and	 annexes	 in	 trade	 agreements,	 and	 a	 range	 of	means	 of	mediating	 or	managing	out	potential	other	stories	or	narratives	about	 the	way	 the	world	could	work	(see	Robertson,	2017).			In	the	following	sections	I	 illustrate	how	such	a	politics	of	expectations	underpins	the	 discursive,	 material	 and	 institutional	 work	 involved	 in	 challenging	 current	imaginings,	 reimagining	 education	 as	 a	market,	 and	 embedding	 new	 institutional	arrangements	like	trade	agreements		so	as	to	socialise	and	normalise	global	trade	in	education	in	the	face	of	struggles	over	the	meanings	and	purposes	of	education	and	its	 governance.	 Actors’	 different	 expectations	 and	 their	 associated	 imaginaries	around	education	–	as	variously	a	public	good,	human	right	or	tradeable	service	–	have	become	 the	 flashpoints	 around	which	political	 struggles	over	education	 into	the	future.	This	has	 led	to	trade	negotiators,	under	pressure	from	their	respective	governments	and	investors,	to	strategically	use	space	and	time	to	limit	alternative	narratives	of	the	future	and	education	from	being	realised.			
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Challenging	Existing	Framings	of	Education:	the	Burden	of	Public	Regulation		In	 April	 1999,	 the	 Institute	 for	 Economic	 Affairs,	 together	 with	 the	 International	Finance	Corporation	(IFC),	published	 the	results	of	a	commissioned	report	on	 the	role	of	private	providers	in	education.	From	the	vantage	point	of	2017	and	looking	back,	 this	 report	 entitled	 The	 Global	 Education	 Industry	 highlights	 the	 regulatory	issues	(viewed	as	impediments	to	trade)	that	at	the	time	faced,	and	which	continue	to	face,	corporations	wanting	to	operate	in	the	education	sector.			The	 Report	 is	 notable	 for	 other	 reasons.	 First,	 the	 International	 Finance	Corporation,	part	of	the	World	Bank	Group,	is	visible	almost	for	the	first	time	as	a	global	actor	in	the	education	sector,	and	one	who	has	over	time	taken	on	a	bigger	and	bigger	role	aimed	at	opening	up	education	markets	in	low-income	countries.	In	the	 Foreword	 to	 the	 Report,	 the	 IFC’s	 Vice	 President	 for	 Finance	 and	 Planning,	Birgitta	Kantola,	points	out	that	the	IFC,	the	private	sector	lending	arm	of	the	World	Bank	Group,	 intended	to	move	 into	new	investment	areas	as	a	result	of	becoming	“…increasingly	aware	of	 the	potential	 to	participate	 in	private	education”	(Tooley,	1999:	 7).	 By	 2001,	 the	 IFC	 began	 framing	 education	 as	 an	 ‘emerging	market’.	 In	doing	 so,	 it	 effectively	 equated	 education	 with	 other	 trade	 domains,	 such	 as	tourism,	extractive	and	other	primary	industries.		Second,	the	report	was	written	by	Professor	James	Tooley,	well	known	throughout	the	1990s	for	his	writings	on	the	relationship	between	the	state	and	education.	His	books,	Disestablishing	 the	School	 (1995),	 and	Education	Without	 the	State	 (1996),	had	already	marked	him	out	as	a	controversial	 figure	both	in	the	UK	and	globally,	especially	his	opposition	to	the	state	education.	In	these	two	books,	Tooley	argued	state	 governed	 education	 was	 failing	 to	 properly	 educate,	 and	 that	 state	government	regulations	increased	inequalities.	The	solution,	he	argued	was	to	open	opportunities	 for	educational	entrepreneurs	 to	create	a	market-based	rather	 than	state-based	or	public	education	sector.		Tooley’s	 Global	 Education	 Industry	 (1999)	 report	 highlighted	 the	 extent	 of	corporate	activity	in	low-income	countries,	and	the	conditions	that	he	argued	might	
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enable	 it	 to	 expand.	 Education	 corporations	 were	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 ‘least	 risky	ventures’	 (p.	 23)	 because	 the	 corporations	 had	 to	worry	 about	 the	 value	 of	 their	brand.	 Tooley	 also	 argued	 this	 kind	 of	 education	 establishment	 would	 also	 help	grow	the	next	generation	of	entrepreneurs	amongst	the	populations	it	operated	in,	and	provide	education	to	families	not	well	served	by	the	public	education	system.		Particular	 attention	 is	 drawn	 by	 Tooley	 to	 the	 frustrations	 faced	 by	 investors	wanting	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 education	 sector	 –	 through	 the	 capitalist	 investor	 is	framed	here	in	Tooley’s	text	as	an	education	entrepreneur.	The	biggest	challenge	to	the	expansion	of	private	education	and	the	creation	of	a	global	education	industry,	he	 noted,	was	 the	 regulatory	 environment	 (Tooley,	 1999:	 95-104).	 A	 selection	 of	quotes	from	the	Report	illustrates	these	arguments:		…although	 regulations	 may	 be	 intended	 to	 protect	 consumers	 and	maintain	 standards,	 they	 often	 act	 to	 inhibit,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 stifle,	needed	 educational	 opportunities	 which	 the	 private	 sector	 could	otherwise	provide.		There	appear	to	be	three	ways	 in	which	regulatory	regimes	can	 inhibit	private	 growth	 and	 investment:	 (i)	 regulations	 are	 substantial,	 but	mainly	 ignored;	 however	 the	 threat	 of	 enforcing	 them	 inhibits	 and	threatens	 operations;	 (ii)	 regulations	 are	 applied	 in	 an	 arbitrary	 or	 ad	hoc	 fashion,	 and	 (iii)	 petty	 regulations	 are	 enforced,	 leading	 to	inconvenience,	inefficiency	and	a	brake	on	growth	(p.	95).		Tooley	draws	attention	to	regulations	that	that	enforced	in	education	systems	in	a	country	 like	 Zimbabwe:	 a	mandatory	 curriculum,	 he	 suggests	 argues,	 inhibits	 the	ability	 of	 private	 schools	 to	 compete	with	 each	 other	 around	 curriculum	 content;	provisional	 registration	 and	 the	 threat	 of	withdrawal	 of	 recognition	 status	 of	 the	provider	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 attract	 students	 to	 start	up	an	operation	 (p.98);	 the	insistence	 on	 compliance	 with	 The	 Teacher’s	 Statute	 which	 regulates	 the	 labour	contract	 for	 teachers	 means	 private	 providers	 cannot	 run	 their	 own	 system	 of	incentives	(p.99);		and	strict	planning	rules	and	regulations	around	marketing	and	recruiting	international	teachers	limits	the	development	and	expansion	of	a	school	market	(p.	100).			
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Tooley	 uses	 case	 studies	 on	 Brazil,	 India	 and	 Turkey	 to	 show	 similar	 kinds	 of	challenges	 facing	 capitalists	 investing	 in	education	as	private	 for-profit	operators.	In	his	conclusions	Tooley	argues	private	sector	companies	have	much	to	offer	 the	development	 agenda	more	 generally,	 and	 innovation	 and	 equity	 in	 the	 education	sector,	 specifically.	 Unless	 regulations	 were	 liberalised	 in	 education,	 he	 argues,	education	 corporations	 are	 unlikely	 to	 emerge	 and	 prosper	 (p.122).	 Here	international	organisations,	 such	as	 the	 IFC,	are	 turned	 to	as	having	an	 important	role	to	play,	not	only	in	helping	change	the	climate	of	receptiveness	to	corporations	interested	in	 investing	 in	education,	but	by	 lending	 investment	funds,	or	credit,	 to	companies	 wanting	 to	 expand	 into	 the	 sector	 (ibid:	 126),	 two	 of	 the	 key	institutional	 mechanisms	 pointed	 to	 by	 Beckert	 (2016:	 4)	 to	 enforce	 the	 future	orientation	of	actors	in	capitalism.		Nearly	two	decades	on,	and	ongoing	efforts	to	reframe	education	as	a	competitive	market	have	expanded	to	the	point	that	the	idea	of	a	global	education	industry	has	been	 normalized.	 However	 efforts	 to	 reformat	 and	 institute	 the	 governance	 of	education	 services	 in	 global	 trade	 architectures	 in	 ways	 that	 privilege	 capitalist	investors	and	competitive	governments	has	been	limited,	though	the	recent	round	of	agreements	(TPP	and	CETA)	show	that	if	these	were	to	be	finally	signed	off,	they	will	 be	 subsumed	 within	 the	 rules	 governing	 global	 economic	 markets.	 What	 is	important,	 however,	 in	 reviewing	 these	 ongoing	 strategic	 efforts,	 is	 to	 show	 the	ways	in	which	the	reframing	of	education	as	a	competitive	market	has	in	turn	been	used	as	a	basis	for	why	it	cannot	be	exempted	from	inclusion	in	global	trade	deals,	and	how	strategically	managing	space	through	processes	like	rescaling	and	secrecy,	has	been	used	to	advance	the	creation	of	capitalist	market-making	in	education.	In	the	section	which	 follows	 I	detail	 the	considerably	reframing	 that	has	 taken	place	via	 competition	 before	 turning	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 formatting	 (building	 on	formatting	 of	 education	 as	 a	 service	 from	 the	 GATS	 agreement)	 and	 a	 range	 of	devices	which	have	been	put	 to	work	 to	help	roll	out	 the	 latest	set	of	agreements	(TPP,	CETA)	that	have	been	concluded.			
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Reimagining	and	Reframing	Education	Via	Competition	A	 first	 shift	 in	 reframing	 centred	on	 transforming	 the	mandate	 for	 education	 and	how	 the	 sector	might	be	 governed	using	principles	of	 competition	 from	capitalist	markets.	 A	 key	 mechanism	 was	 the	 use	 of	 neoliberal	 ideology	 to	 reimagine	 and	guide	a	new	development	model	 for	governments	around	the	world.	This	entailed	the	 rolling	 back	 of	 the	 post-war	 welfare	 state	 (Tickell	 and	 Peck,	 2003)	 and	 the	rolling	out	of	a	new	political	project	that	would	transform	the	economic	and	social	landscapes	 of	many	 countries	 around	 the	world.	 The	 economic	 crisis	 in	 the	 early	1970s	 provided	 the	 entry	 point	 for	 early	 work	 in	 orchestrating	 this	 shift.		Neoliberals	 argued	 the	 future	 wealth	 of	 nations	 depended	 on	 cutting	 the	 cost	 of	government	 and	 creating	 the	 conditions	 whereby	 the	 private	 sector	 could	 boost	productivity	 through	 competition,	 efficiencies,	 and	 innovation-driven	 profits.	Beginning	 with	 Chile	 in	 the	 1970s	 (Peck,	 2010),	 then	 later	 the	 United	 States	 of	America	 (USA),	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (UK),	 Australia,	 and	 New	 Zealand,	 amongst	others,	exponents	of	free	markets	and	neoliberalism	promoted	the	liberalisation	of	existing	economic	arrangements	(tariffs,	 financial	regulations),	the	privatization	of	key	 public	 sector	 activities	 (state-owned	 enterprises	 like	 utilities),	 and	 the	marketization	 of	 public	 services,	 like	 health	 and	 education	 (Harvey,	 2005).	 Leys	(2003)	describes	this	as	market-driven	politics	aimed	at	creating	a	market	society.	A	visible	manifestation	of	this	shift	 in	the	schooling	sector	was	the	introduction	of	choice	 policies	 that	 drove	 competition,	 along	with	 opening	 out	 the	 sector	 to	 new	providers.	 Similar	 features	 appear	 in	 the	 higher	 education	 sector,	 though	competition	for	students	extended	out	into	the	international	arena.				A	second	shift	in	reframing	education	was	the	reconceptualization	of	its	purpose;	as	a	key	sector	to	promote	the	stock	of	human	capital	and	knowledge,	on	the	one	hand,	and	 to	 boost	 creativity	 and	 innovation	 to	 feed	 the	 development	 competitive	knowledge-based	economies,	on	the	other.	A	raft	of	initiatives	were	launched:	these	ranged	 from	 widening	 access	 to	 education	 against	 targets;	 greater	 levels	 of	investment	in	research	and	development	in	universities;	the	launch	of	programmes	to	 produce	 entrepreneurs;	 the	 creation	 of	 incubators	 in	 universities	 to	 generate	
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patents	and	spin-out	firms;	and	the	development	of	infrastructures,	like	technology	transfer	 offices	 to	 boost	 the	 connection	 between	 knowledge	 creation	 and	 value	creation.						A	third	shift	has	centred	on	the	possibilities	for	rapidly	generating	new	knowledge	from	large	amounts	of	data,	as	well	as	to	transport	knowledge	in	immaterial	forms.		In	 essence,	 this	 third	 dynamic	 involves	 the	 constant	 reframing	 of	 knowledge	 into	digitally-driven	 information	 which	 has	 changed	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 production	 of	information	 and	 knowledge	 and	 modes	 of	 access.	 	 In	 the	 education	 world,	knowledge	 products	 that	 can	 be	 digitized,	 such	 as	 e-books,	 are	 now	 no	 longer	constrained	by	the	 limitations	of	physical	storage.	Libraries	are	able	 to	hold	more	stock	 because	 some	 of	 it	 is	 virtual,	 though	 this	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 they	 have	widened	 access.	Digital	 locks	 and	 other	 devices	manage	 the	 value	 chain.	Digitally	collected	 information,	 or	 big	 data,	 is	 now	 an	 important	 building	 block	 for	 new	products	and	services	around	the	creation,	storage,	analysis,	sharing	and	innovative	recombining	 of	 data	 and	 information.	 For	 instance	 large	 student	 satisfaction	surveys	with	their	university	experience	carried	out	by	companies,	like	i-Graduate	or	the	Princeton	Review,	gather	data	and	sell	 information	to	students	as	to	where	best	to	study.	Massive	Open	Online	Courses	(MOOCs),	which	emerged	around	2010,	now	 sit	 on	 platforms	 which	 generate	 learning	 analytics	 data.	 Companies	 like	LinkedIn	 not	 only	 connect	 data	 on	 the	 learning	 and	 employment	 profiles	 of	individuals,	 but	 they	 also	 use	 this	 information	 to	 create	 new	 services	 around	recruitment	 (Komljenovic,	 2016).	 The	 Cloud	 is	 also	 routinely	 used	 to	 store	education-related	data	from	libraries	of	papers	to	large	data-sets.	Facebook	is	used	by	 education	 institutions	 to	 bring	 groups	 of	 learners	 and	 other	 study	 groups	together,	as	well	as	being	a	means	of	keeping	in	touch	with	alumni.	However,	these	global	companies	do	not	reach	into	each	country;	China	for	instance	places	limits	on	the	operation	of	digital	 firms	 inside	 its	borders	–	 such	as	Facebook	and	YouTube.		Information	 can	 now	 command	 a	 premium	 in	 terms	 of	 value,	 whilst	 the	infrastructures	 of	 the	 Internet,	 such	 as	 platforms,	 are	 able	 to	 charge	 significant	rents	over	time.		
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	It	 follows	 that	 with	 such	 a	 significant	 investment	 in,	 and	 dependence	 upon,	 the	‘global	education	services	market’	 	 -	 that	 investors,	governments,	and	 institutions,	have	 given	 some	 thought	 as	 to	 how	 to	 maintain	 or	 increase	 their	 share	 of	 the	various	education	services	markets	–	from	recruiting	international	student	mobility	(see	Komljenovic,	2017	in	this	issue),	to	attracting	talented	high	skilled	labour,	the	recognition	 of	 credentials,	 the	 sale	 of	 learning	 products,	 fee-for	 service	 quality	assurance,	the	list	goes	on.	It	should	come	as	no	surprise	that	these	actors	have	also	been	active	in	trade	talks,	and	particularly	following	the	2008	global	financial	crisis,	as	 pressure	 has	 grown	 to	 open	 up	 education	 sectors	 to	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 actors,	selling	a	wider	array	of	services	across	territorial	boundaries.				
Formatting	Education	as	A	Tradeable	Service		It	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 reimagine,	 and	 reframe,	 education	 as	 a	 competitive	 sector	producing	 knowledge	 and	 skills	 for	 the	 economy	 and	 wider	 society.	 It	 is	 quite	another	 thing	 to	 ‘reformat’	education	 in	such	a	way	 that	 it	 can	be	 talked	about	 in	terms	similar	to	trading	in	goods	–	much	as	in	the	General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	 (GATTS),	 which	 organised	 global	 trade	 in	 the	 post-World	 War	 II	 period	(Kelsey,	2008).		For	example,	when	governments	report	on	GDP,	they	report	on	the	dollar	 value	 of	 goods	 and	 services	 that	 have	 been	produced	 in	 any	 one	 year	 as	 a	measure	of	 economic	activity.	 	When	governments	 report	on	export	 from	various	goods	and	services,	they	are	reporting	on	the	dollar	value	of	what	has	been	earned	by	that	country.		More	recently,	governments	have	been	representing	education	as	a	sector	in	their	export	figures,	but	what	is	the	basis	of	this	measure.		Until	 recently,	 education	 had	 not	 been	 formatted	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 can	 be	measured	and	represented	in	trade	figures.	 	Rather,	education	tended	to	be	talked	about	 in	 terms	 of	 inputs	 (e.g.	 %	 of	 GDP	 spent	 on	 education)	 and	 outputs	 (e.g.	number	of	15	year	olds	with	a	leaving	school	qualification;	%	of	GDP	spent	on	R&D).		But	spending	money	on	a	sector,	or	measuring	the	outputs	by	way	of	credentials	is	
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very	different	to	measuring	the	value	of	the	sector	in	trade	terms.	This	is	because,	as	a	 public	 service,	 it	was	 not	 a	 commodity	 in	market	 exchanges.	 	 As	 a	 service,	 it	 is	intrinsically	 social,	 and	 even	 if	 privately	 provided	 –	 such	 as	 by	 the	 church	 or	 a	charity,	 its	 social	 relations	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 socially	 ascribed	 (such	 as	 in	 the	production	 of	 elites)	 rather	 than	 economically	 described.	 	 As	 Kelsey	 observes	 of	public	 services	 more	 generally;	 “Their	 form	 and	 content	 has	 been	 designed	 to	deliver	 a	 range	 of	 functions:	 individual	 well-being,	 employment,	 training,	infrastructure,	 communications,	 community	 development,	 regional	 development,	economic	development,	and	cultural	transfer”	(Kelsey,	2003:	268).			The	first	major	effort	at	formatting	education	in	such	a	way	that	it	can	be	included	in,	 and	 regulated	 by,	 global	 trade	 rules,	 was	 to	 translate	 education	 as	 a	 public	service	into	a	legal	form	as	a	services	sector	using	the	GATT.	This	occurred	with	the	General	 Agreement	 on	 Trade	 in	 Services	 (GATS)	 -	 launched	 in	 1995	 with	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	 Organization.	 	 	 The	 WTO’s	 mandate	 was	 to	“…formalize,	 deepen	 and	 widen	 an	 international	 system	 of	 trade	 regulation	(Wilkinson,	2002:	129).	Yet	there	were	problems	in	defining	services	like	education	using	the	language	of	trade	in	goods.		As	Winham	points	out:		…services	 are	 processes,	 defining	 them	 is	 difficult,	 unless	 a	 strict	functional	definition	 is	employed.	…The	tasks	 for	the	negotiators	at	 the	Uruguay	 Round	 were	 to	 incorporate	 GATT	 principles	 of	 transparency,	national	 treatment	and	reciprocity,	as	well	as	newer	principles	such	as	market	access,	into	areas	of	trade	that	were	conceptually	dissimilar	from	trade	in	goods	(2005:	101).				The	result	was	a	service	agreement	that	was;	“…not	yet	complete,	not	terribly	user	friendly,	 with	 a	 complex	 geometry	 and	 al	 a	 carte	 obligations	 set	 against	 the	backdrop	 of	 near	 universal	 coverage	 and	 sovereign	 immunity	 in	 liberalization	matters”	(Sauve,	2002:	3).		However	as	Kelsey	observes,	in	drawing	on	the	GATT	in	this	 way	 (rule-based	 trade)	 it	 also	 implied	 an	 equivalence	 between	 services	 and	industrially-produced	 goods	 and	 in	 doing	 do,	 foreclosed	 any	 debate	 around	 the	social	nature	of	services	(Kelsey,	2003:		270).				
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The	complexity	of	 this	rules-based	 format	 in	 turn	 is	strategically	selective	of	 legal	expertise	 and	 trade	 negotiators.	 For	 instance,	members	who	 joined	 the	WTO	 are	described	 as	 opting	 in	 under	 ‘a	 single	 undertaking’	 to	 a	 series	 of	 ‘legally-binding	rules’	 and	 a	 ‘built-in	 agenda’	 to	 engage	 in	 ‘on-going	 negotiations’	 leading	 to	‘progressive	liberalisation’.	All	sectors	of	education	were	included	in	GATS,	though	it	was	then	up	to	the	negotiators	as	to	which	modes	and	sectors	might	be	listed	for	agreement.			The	GATS	format	has	three	components.	The	first	 is	a	 framework	of	rules	that	 lay	down	 the	general	obligations	governing	 trade	 in	 services,	much	as	 it	did	with	 the	GATT.	It	also	laid	out	basic	elements,	such	as;	‘transparency’	of	all	regulation	at	all	levels	 of	 government	 and	 including	 also	 non-governmental	 bodies	 exercising	governmental	power	or	authority	(regarded	as	very	important	given	the	density	of	services	 trade),	 ‘most-favoured	 nation’	 (MFN)	 treatment,	 ‘market	 access’	 and	‘national	treatment’.	In	the	second	component	there	are	annexes	on	specific	service	sectors,	 like	 education,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 movement	 of	 natural	 persons.	 The	 third	component	 consists	 of	 ‘schedules	 of	 commitments’	 detailing	 the	 liberalisation	commitments	of	each	WTO	member.			The	GATS	also	distinguishes	between	‘four	modes	of	supply’	through	which	services	can	 be	 traded:	Mode	1:	 cross	border	 supply;	Mode	2:	 consumption	abroad;	Mode	3:	
commercial	presence;	 and	Mode	4:	movement	of	natural	persons.	 	According	 to	 this	GATS	framework,	an	exemption	can	only	to	granted	to	a	services	sector	to	remain	in	the	 public	 domain	 if,	 as	 specified	 under	 GATS	 Article	 1.3	 it	 is	 supplied	 “…in	 the	exercise	 of	 governmental	 authority”	 (Art	 1.3(b)),	 and	 is	 “supplied	 neither	 on	 a	commercial	basis	nor	in	competition	with	one	or	more	service	providers”	(Art.	1.3	(c)).		Governmental	authority	here	was	interpreted	in	a	narrow	sense	(WTO,	1998;	see	also	Krajewski	2016:	2-3).	That	 is,	 the	 idea	of	 governmental	 authority	 is	only	applicable	 to	 core	 sovereign	 functions	 and	 not	 applicable	 where	 there	 is	 any	remuneration,	or	where	there	 is	evidence	of	competition	–	meaning	there	are	one	or	more	service	suppliers.	 	 	 In	essence,	education	 is	difficult	 to	exclude	a	priori	 in	
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many	WTO	countries	in	that	they	have	introduced	elements	of	competition	into	the	governance	of	their	education	sectors,	as	described	above.					Aside	from	the	technical	details,	it	is	important	to	note	the	formatting	of	education	into	a	 legal,	contractual,	 language	with	mechanisms	such	as	Dispute	Settlement	 to	resolve	 differences	 between	 countries	 and	 investors.	 As	 Kelsey	 argues,	 overnight	the	reformatting	of	education	 into	the	 language	of	 the	GATS	meant	that	education	was	 	 “…magically	 transformed	 into	 an	 expression	 of	 objective	 reality	 and	 an	abstract	 normative	 instrument	 based	 on	 general	 principles,	 rules	 and	 technical	terms.	 Those	who	 accepted	 its	 legitimacy	 represented	 the	 assumptions	 as,	 values	and	interests	that	underpin	the	Agreement	as	unquestionable	and	timeless”	(Kelsey,	2003:	269)				Formatting	education	in	this	way	also	transforms	the	meaning	of	education	in	that	as	a	service	it	is	not	only	abstracted,	but	it	is	also	fragmented.		The	core	activity	of	a	university	 falls	 under	 post-Secondary	 technical	 and	 vocational	 services.	 Other	higher	education	services,	Adult	education	services,	Sporting	services,	Research	and	experimental	development	services	on	natural	sciences	and	engineering,	and	so	on,	all	 fall	under	different	codings	(Kelsey,	2003:	 	275).	This	 is	taken	one	step	further	with	 Public	 Private	 Partnerships	 in	 that	 the	 services	 are	 disaggregated	 in	accordance	with	 the	operational	principles	of	 the	contracted	 firm	–	 in	 the	 form	of	procurement,	financial	services,	labour	and	the	like.		The	GATS	 formatting	of	 education,	 as	 a	 services	 sector	 governed	by	 international	trade	rules,	has	been	extended	out	into	other	trade	agreements,	such	as	the	bilateral	agreements	 between	 countries	 (e.g.	 Singapore	 and	 the	 US;	 Europe	 and	 South	Korea),	as	well	as	 into	the	current	round	of	recently	completed	or	still	under	way	trade	agreements.	These	 include	 the	Trans-Pacific	Partnership	 (TPP)	 involving	12	countries	in	the	Pacific	Region	dominated	by	the	United	States;	the	Comprehensive	Economic	Trade	Agreement	(CETA)	between	Canada	and	Europe;	the	Transatlantic	Trade	and	Investment	Partnership	(TTIP)	 involving	Europe	and	the	United	States;	and	the	Trade	in	Services	Agreement	(TISA)	largely	between	OECD	countries.			
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A	related	but	different	kind	of	formatting	concerns	efforts	to	measure	and	generate	a	 value	 for	 the	 education	 sector,	 and	 its	 worth	 as	 an	 export.	 Different	 countries	calculate	 these	 differently,	 even	 through	 they	 may	 well	 be	 compared	 with	 each	other	 for	 competitive	 purposes.	 The	 first	 step	 is	 to	 define	 what	 counts	 as	 an	education	 export,	 which	 may	 or	 may	 not	 equate	 to	 the	 GATS	 conception	 of	education	 exports.	 In	 a	 policy	 document	 launched	 in	 2013	 to	 promote	 the	expansion	of	education	exports	as	a	strategic	sector,	the	UK	government	(BIS,	2013:	21)	stated:		“Education	exports	are	defined	as	those	activities	where	money	comes	to	 the	UK	 from	an	overseas	 source,	 either	 for	an	education-related	activity	 taking	place	 in	 the	 UK	 (e.g.	 international	 students	 studying	 at	 a	 UK	 HEI)	 or	 from	 an	education-related	 activity	 occurring	 overseas	 (e.g.	 TNE)”.	 The	 Australian	Government,	on	the	other	hand,	using	the	Australian	Bureau	of	Statistics	categories,	refers	 to	 the	 fees	 and	 goods	 and	 services	 paid	 for	 by	 international	 ‘onshore	students’	 as	 ‘education-related	 personal	 travel’	 (Department	 for	 Education	 and	Training,	2014).			The	next	step	is	to	decide	what	to	itemise	as	generating	value;	for	the	UK	calculators	in	2013,	 this	 included	 tuition	 fees,	 living	 costs,	 language	costs,	 and	 ‘other’.	 	These	figures	are	 then	broken	down	by	sector	and	 	 (higher	education,	 schools,	 language	schools,	further	education)	and	education	products	and	services.	The	final	value	of	education	exports	was	then	estimated	to	be	£17,490	billion.	 	Aside	from	economic	value,	other	values	are	claimed,	such	as	the	reputational	value	of	UK	education	and	promoting	 British	 values.	 	 Unlike	 the	 UK,	 the	 Australian	 government	 includes	distant	learning	(referred	to	as	‘correspondence	courses)	and	consultancies	in	their	figures.			The	central	task	here	for	governments	and	industry	is	valuation	and	pricing	so	as	to	enable	 a	 market	 to	 function.	 And	 indeed,	 argues	 Aspers	 and	 Beckert	 (2011:	 30)	markets	 fail	 if	 the	problem	of	valuation	cannot	be	 resolved.	 	There	has	been	very	little	work,	however,	on	this	aspect	of	education	markets;	 the	socially-constructed	nature	 of	 the	 value	 of	 an	 education	 service,	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 formatting	 and	evaluation	 that	 are	 deployed	 to	 arrive	 at	 decisions.	 	 These	 might	 include	 the	
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difference	between	standard	markets	and	status	markets	(e.g.	bog	standard	versus	ivy	 league	universities),	 the	 role	of	 judgement	 (e.g.	what	 is	being	used	 to	decide),	and	the	concept	of	singularity	versus	heterarchy	(e.g.	an	education	credential	only	versus	an	education	credential		plus	social	networks	and	access	to	political	power)	(Aspers	and	Beckert,	2011:	31).		
	
Devices		I	 have	 made	 the	 point	 above	 that	 markets	 do	 not	 come	 into	 existence	 without	considerable	work	at	generating	equivalences	between	social	activity	and	economic	activity,	and	 from	there,	economic	activity	 into	competitive	market	activity	 that	 is	dynamic	and	 innovative.	 	 Formatting	 thus	describes	 the	 ‘what’,	 or	 the	meaning	of	something.		However	a	series	of	devices	or	instruments,	or	the	matter	of	‘how’,	can	be	shown	to	be	fundamental	to	the	work	of	global	market	making.		The	Agreements	 themselves	are	not	 just	 formatting	 tools	but	 they	also	devices	 in	that	 they	 are	 not	 just	 negotiated,	 but	 consulted,	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 contested	through	 dispute	 processes.	 The	 Agreements	 are	 lengthy,	 with	 the	 TPP	 spanning	some	 5000	 pages,	 made	 up	 of	 Chapters,	 their	 Rules,	 and	 Annexes	 specifying	 the	detail	of	listings	of	exclusions.		The	Agreements	are	consulted	by	trade	experts	and	arbitrators	with	regard	to	the	detail	of	a	claim,	or	of	a	case.	They	also	house	other	devices	that	are		put	to	work,	and	which	work	on,	making	a	global	education	market	that	is	regulated	through	trade	rules.	These	devices	within	the	larger	agreement	include	lists	of	exclusions	and	inclusions	–	referred	to	either	a	Positive	List	or	Negative	List.		Under	the	GATS,	a	Positive	List	is	 used	 and	 it	 is	 this	 list	 –	 that	 is	 –	 what	 is	 listed,	 that	 is	 included	 in	 offers	 to	negotiate.		Under	the	TPP,	CETA	and	the	TTIP,	a	negative	list	is	used.			A	negative	list	means	identifying	all	those	activities	that	are	to	be	excluded	so	that	what	is	not	on	
the	list	is	included.	TISA	uses	a	combination	of	a	positive	and	negative	list.		It	is	the	negative	 list	 that	 is	 the	most	powerful	 in	colonizing	 the	 future	 for	 the	 investor,	 in	
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that	 all	 future	 activity	 is	 viewed	 as	 wound	 into	 progressive	 liberalization	automatically.			Standstill	and	ratchet	clauses	are	devices	within	the	Agreement	which	regulate	the	ongoing	expansion	of	the	global	education	market.		By	‘standstill’	the	recent	mega-trade	agreements	mean	there	can	be	no	reversals	away	from	the	current	 levels	of	liberalization	in	the	sector.	The	ratchet	clause	means	any	new	activity	in	the	sector	into	the	future	will	be	subject	to	the	principles	of	the	market	and	the	interests	of	the	investors,	 as	 enshrined	 in	 the	 trade	 agreement.	 The	 ratchet	 process	 thus	 aims	 to	draw	more	and	more	of	the	society	into	functioning	like	a	capitalist	market.	 	With	its	 face	 to	 the	 future,	 and	more	and	more	 competition	 in	 the	 sector	as	 a	 result	of	more	and	more	markets	being	opened	up,	 the	overall	dynamics	of	 the	sector	also	has	 consequences	 for	 those	 actors	 in	 the	 sector	 whose	 cognitive	 frames	 will	 be	oriented	to	capitalist	market-making.			Investor	State	Dispute	Mechanisms	(ISDS)	are	devices	deployed	to	mediate	disputes	between	 investors	 and	 governments.	 	 Over	 time,	 they	 have	 become	 particularly	popular,	with	 a	 steady	 rise	 in	 cases;	 some	70	 cases	were	 filed	 in	2015	 (UNCTAD,	2016).	As	a	device,	they	tend	to	work	in	the	interests	of	the	investors,	in	large	part	as	these	are	ad-hoc	tribunals,	in	part	because	they	display	a	pro-investor	bias,	and	because		there	is	a	lack	of	transparency	around	the	arbitration	process.	Research	by	Van	 Harten	 (2012:	 6)	 confirms	 this;	 drawing	 upon	 empirical	 evidence,	 he	 shows	there	 is	 systematic	 bias	 in	 the	 arbitration	 resolutions	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 major	Western	 capital-exporting	 states.	 	The	 secretive	nature	of	 the	arbitration	process,	and	 the	 lack	of	any	requirement	 to	consider	precedent,	allows	plenty	of	scope	 for	creative	adjudications	(Economist,	2014).			The	Economist	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	sharp	rise	in	contentious	arbitrations	are	the	result	of	companies	having	learnt	how	to	 exploit	 ISDS	 clauses,	 going	 as	 far	 as	 buying	 firms	 in	 jurisdictions	 where	 they	apply	simply	to	gain	access	to	them.				
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A	rather	different	kind	of	device	has	been	used	to	legitimize	trade	agreements	are	Impact	Assessments.	 	 ‘Impact	Assessments’	used	to	convince	sceptics	and	to	enrol	promoters,	 and	 thus	 align	 expectations,	 as	 to	 the	 longer-term	 outcomes	 of	 these	deals.	 The	 Impact	 Assessment	 for	 the	 TTIP	 was	 conducted	 by	 the	 Centre	 for	European	Policy	Studies	(CEPS),	a	pro-business	think-tank	located	in	Brussels	(see	Pelkmans	et	al.,	2014).	The	results	of	the	Impact	Assessment	were	then	used	by	the	European	 Commission	 to	 project	 the	 annual	 gains	 to	 be	 had	 from	 the	 TTIP;	 of	€119b	for	the	EU,	and	€95b	for	the	USA,	suggesting	that	European	countries	would	be	the	main	beneficiaries.		However	devices	are	never	neutral,	and	nor	are	Impact	Assessments	of	this	kind	in	that	it	makes	specific	assumptions	about	capitalist	markets	and	futures.	De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	 (2015)	 show	 that	 the	 TTIP	 Impact	 Assessment	 depends	 on	 the	Computational	 General	 Equilibrium	 Modelling	 (CGEM).	 CGEM	 embraces	neoclassical	 economic	 assumptions:	 there	 is	 no	 excess	 demand,	 all	markets	 clear	under	 conditions	 of	 perfect	 competition,	 and	 we	 can	 model	 market	 processes	through	numerical	data	and	results.	Yet	De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	argue	that	CGE	models	have	been	subject	to	critique,	even	within	economics,	in	that	there	are	information	 asymmetries,	 individuals	 are	 often	 driven	 by	 more	 complex	 sets	 of	values,	 and	 labour	 and	product	markets	 rarely	 clear	 at	 the	 same	 time.	The	CGEM	was	used	to	model	three	kinds	of	policy	options	for	TTIP;	from	a	baseline	option	to	a	comprehensive	and	ambitious	one,	of	removing	all	duties,	reducing	tariff	and	non-tariff	barriers	(NTBs)	on	goods	and	services,	and	on	government	procurement.	For	the	base-line	option,	the	gains	are	negligible.	The	gains	on	the	more	comprehensive	scenario,	the	one	used	by	the	Commission	to	make	the	economic	case	for	TTIP,	were	presented	 as	 more	 substantial.	 And	 it	 is	 this	 latter	 	 -	 more	 generous	 -	 imagined	future	that	is	used	by	the	Commission	in	its	public	defense	of	TTIP.		De	Ville	and	Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	argue	 that	 this	device	 -	an	 Impact	Assessment	 	 -	acts	 like	 a	 black	 box;	 it	 not	 only	 skews	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 economic	 and	 political	debate	 in	 directions	 that	 suit	 the	 Commission’s	 agenda,	 but	 also	 has	 a	 particular	narrative	that	 it	offers	of	the	present	and	the	future.	 	This	future	does	not	 include	
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the	costs	that	result	from	macro-economic	adjustments	–	such	as	alignment	to	new	standards,	 the	displacement	and	retraining	of	workers,	potential	welfare	 losses	 in	the	 society,	 or	 the	 threat	 to	 public	 policy	 goals	 (De	 Ville	 and	 Siles-Brȕgge,	 2015:	669).	 In	 contesting	 this	 Impact	 Assessment	 narrative,	 De	 Ville	 and	 Siles-Brȕgge	(2015)	present	the	case	of	 the	North	American	Free	Trade	Agreement,	which	also	used	the	CGEM.	They	compare	the	ex-post	evidence	with	the	ex-ante	claims	which	show	 that	 both	 Mexico	 and	 Canada	 fared	 significantly	 worse	 than	 predicted	 in	terms	 of	 economic	 gains	 (especially	 around	 costs	 over	 labour	 displacements).	 In	relation	to	TTIP,	they	argue	a	combination	of	the	assumptions	built	into	the	CGEM,	the	 regulatory	 mechanism	 to	 be	 used,	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 liberalise	 across	 the	board,	 exaggerates	 the	 potential	 economic	 benefits	 of	 TTIP	 whilst	 under-playing	other	 likely	 outcomes	 –	 such	 as	 a	 race-to-the-bottom	 in	 social,	 educational	 and	environmental	standards.	 	 	Yet	devices	take	some	expertise,	and	effort,	to	open	up	and	unpack	 the	assumptions;	all	necessary	 to	enable	us	 to	see	 the	work	 that	 they	are	 asked	 to	 do	 in	 both	 legitimizing	 trade	 negotiations	 and	 ensuring	 their	 final	conclusion.			
	
Strategies	and	Counter-Strategies		–	Space	and	Time	Despite	 the	 deployment	 of	 seemingly	 technical	 activity,	 like	 formatting	 and	 the	deployment	 of	 devices	 to	 bring	 global	 education	markets	 into	 being,	 the	 ongoing	navigation	of	these	projects	requires	major	strategic	efforts.	The	failure	of	the	GATS	negotiations	to	secure	commitments,	not	just	on	education	but	more	broadly,	points	to	 the	visible	politics	at	play	when	competing	narratives	are	 still	 circulating	as	 to	the	meaning	of	a	social	activity.		This	was	powerfully	shown	in	the	case	of	education	and	 the	 GATS	 Ministerial	 Meeting	 in	 Hong	 Kong	 in	 2005;	 this	 meeting	 was	accompanied	 by	 protests	 on	 the	 street,	 and	 other	 organized	 opposition	 in	 global	civil	 society.	 	 This	was	despite	 efforts	 to	meet	 in	 locations	with	might	not	 attract	attention,	or	high	levels	of	security	as	to	who	might	have	press	or	observer	status.		Investors	and	governments	have	also	used	rescaling	g	as	a	spatial	strategy.		
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Following	the	challenges	facing	the	GATS	negotiations,	the	free	trade	advocates	and	corporations	 shifted	 their	 efforts	 to	 new	 forums,	 including	 bilateral	 agreements,	regional	agreements	and	national	 institutions	 to	keep	advancing	 this	agenda.	This	spatial	 strategy	 materializes	 ‘forum	 shifting’.	 At	 the	 national	 level,	 interested	education	 services	 providers	 approached	 nationally	 located	 regulatory	 bodies	 to	make	claims	to	enter	the	sector	(Robertson	and	Komljenovic,	2017).	At	the	regional	level,	agreements	 like	European	Union’s	Directive	on	Services	were	advanced	and	finally	 agreed	 to	 in	2006	 (European	Parliament	 and	Council,	 2006)	 (ibid).	 	At	 the	bilateral	 level,	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 Bilateral	 and	 Preferential	 Trading	Agreements	 were	 advanced	 (Horn	 et	 al,	 2010).	 In	 combination,	 these	 spatial	strategies,	to	target	different	forums,	moved	the	trade	agenda	forward.		Similarly	 investors	 have	 used	 a	 strategic	 engagement	 with	 place	 for	 their	 own	purposes.	Investors	have	used	particular	jurisdictions	and	forums	to	make	a	claim	so	as	to	get	the	most	‘return’	regarding	potential	investor	pay-outs.		The	ISDS	space	of	 arbitration	 is	also	only	available	 to	 foreign	 investors,	 thus	privileging	powerful	transnational	 investors	 (large	 corporations)	 over	 and	 above	 nationally-located	education	investors.		Indeed,	ISDS	gives	exclusive	rights	to	foreign	investors;	rights	not	 available	 to	 domestic	 investors	 or	 citizens.	 Foreign	 investors	 are	 not	 even	obliged	 to	 exhaust	 the	domestic	 legal	 system	before	 turning	 to	 ISDS.	This	uneven	terrain	 is	 the	 result	 of	 different	 degrees	 of	 economic	 and	 political	 liberalisation	operating	 vertically	 and	 horizontally,	 of	 overlapping	 and	 competing	 spaces	 and	places	regarding	trade	rules,	and	the	capacity	for	the	transnational	corporations	to	skew	the	rules	of	the	game	toward	themselves.		Each	 of	 the	 current	 trade	 negotiations	 has	 also	 sought	 to	 use	 space	 strategically,	albeit	it	in	democratically	questionable	ways.	The	TPP,	TISA	and	CETA	have	all	been	conducted	in	secret;	getting	access	to	the	documents	has	largely	been	the	result	of	wikileaks.	 	 TISA	 is	 also	 being	 negotiated	 outside	 of	 the	 WTO	 space,	 though	 in	Geneva.	Secrecy	has	 its	costs	as	the	 lack	of	shared	expectation	about	the	future	of	education	as	a	services	sector	places	 limits	on	 its	potential	 to	get	 traction	on,	and	control,	share	cognitive	orientations	to	the	future.			
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	Time	 is	 also	 a	 key	 political	 resource,	 and	 quite	 central	 to	 appreciating	 the	complexities	involved	in	market	making.		The	challenges	involved	making	education	into	a	market	is	that	its	temporal	orientations	and	rhythms	are	quite	different	to	a	dynamic	capitalist	market.	To	begin,	 the	 temporality	of	education	worlds	 involves			time	orders	which	stretch	out,	rather	than	pace	up,	social	life	(sitting,	waiting,	turn	taking,	and	so	on).	If	the	future	is	invoked,	it	is	more	likely	to	be	with	a	concern	for	social	 mobility,	 or	 becoming	 someone.	 However	 capitalist	 markets	 demand	constant	attention	 to	 the	 future	so	as	 to	profit	 from	new	opportunities	and	guard	against	 hazards.	 Time-future	 is	 also	 political	 resource	 to	 be	 captured,	 whilst	individual	 actors’	 orientations	 to	 this	 different	 market	 future	 need	 to	 be	recalibrated	so	as	to	stabilize	new	meanings,	practices	and	commonsense.	 	 	Trade	agreements	 are	 rich	 with	 various	 devices	 which	 work	 on	 this	 cognitive	reorientation	 to	 the	 future.	 	 Stand-still,	 ratchet	 and	 progressive	 liberalization	clauses	 are	 all	 aimed	 at	 this	 recalibration	 (Robertson,	 2017).	 However	 in	 the	current	trade	deals	(TISA,	TPP,	CETA	and	TIPP)	the	future	has	also	been	colonized	by	 the	 investors	 via	mechanism	and	devices	which	discourage	 governments	 from	putting	the	brakes	on,	or	reversing	decisions	around	the	making	of	global	markets.		Such	penalties,	worked	out	 in	the	Investor	State	Dispute	Settlement	cases,	 include	paying	 the	 investor	 future	 lost	 earnings	 that	 might	 have	 been	 anticipated	 as	 a	return.	In	effect,	 this	places	the	economy,	or	the	market,	beyond	politics.	Powered	on	by	progressive	liberalization	and	the	ratchet	effect,	unhindered	by	government	regulations,	 gives	 unfettered	 momentum	 to	 an	 ever-expanding	 world	 of	 global	market	making.	 	Future	time	 is	 thus	a	prize	worth	 fighting	 for	by	 investors,	 for	 in	doing	so,	they	aim	to	claim,	and	contain,	an	as	yet	unknown	future.			Yet	time	past,	or	memory,	also	tells	a	story	about	the	frictions	in	making	education	markets	globally;	that	of	failed	meetings,	disillusioned	developing	countries,	and	the	questioning	 of	 the	 viability	 of	 a	 system	 of	 global	 governance.	 These	 different	temporally-located	narratives	point	to	the	complexities	of	market	marking	and	the	considerable	contestation	and	contradictions	which	have	accompanied	this	process.		
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Those	 opposing	 the	 inclusion	 of	 education	 in	 GATS	 during	 the	 2000’s,	 as	well	 as	those	 opposing	 the	 current	 round	 of	 trade	 negotiations	 and	 agreements	 which	include	education	as	a	services	sector,	enroll	a	competing	narrative;	education	as	a	human	 right	 and	 entitlement	 as	 recognized	 in	 international	 instruments	 (most	prominently	the	International	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	launched	in	1948	after	World	War	 II,	 and	 the	 Convention	 of	 the	 Human	 Rights	 of	 the	 Child	 launched	 in	1959)	and	a	public	service.		In	a	specially	commissioned	report	on	GATS,	the	Special	Rapporteur	 for	 Education	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 “…rapid	 development	 of	international	 trade	 law	 necessitated	 a	 decisive	 reaffirmation	 of	 education	 as	 a	human	right”	(Tomasevski,	2001:	5).	This	led	her	to	observe:		…the	 liberalization	 of	 trade	 in	 services,	 without	 adequate	 government	regulation	 and	 proper	 assessment	 of	 its	 affects,	 can	 have	 undesirable	effects.	 Different	 service	 sectors	 require	 different	 policies	 and	 time	frames	 for	 liberalization	 and	 some	 areas	 are	 better	 left	 under	governmental	 authority	 (p.	20)…While	 the	WTO	Agreements	provide	a	legal	 framework	 for	 the	economic	aspects	of	 the	 liberalisation	of	 trade,	they	focus	on	commercial	objectives.	The	norms	and	standards	of	human	rights	provide	 the	means	of	providing	a	 legal	 framework	 for	 the	 social	dimensions	 of	 human	 rights…A	 human	 rights	 approach	 to	 trade	liberalisation	emphasizes	the	role	of	the	State,	not	only	as	negotiator	of	trade	rules	and	setter	of	trade	policy,	but	also	as	duty	bearer	for	human	rights	(Tomasevski,	2001:	10).			
	
	
Conclusions	I	began	this	paper	by	arguing	that	making	education	markets	entails	a	great	deal	of	work,	 and	 sought	 to	 show	 the	 complexities	 of	 the	 work	 through	 ideas	 like	reframing,	 formatting,	 devices	 and	 the	 strategic	 use	 of	 time	 and	 space.	 Of	 course	markets	 also	 need	 to	 be	 instituted	 in	 ways	 that	 also	 help	 in	 their	 ongoing	reproduction,	 and	 it	 is	 here	 that	 there	 is	 still	 some	distance	 to	 go	with	 regard	 to	global	 trade	 agreements.	 The	 GATS	 Agreement	 languishes,	 though	 the	 United	Kingdom’s	 intended	 exit	 from	Europe,	 he	 now	 infamous	Brexit,	might	 provide	 an	unexpected	boost	 to	 the	WTO’s	GATS	 in	 that	 it	will	 be	pressured	 to	 seek	out	 this	
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kind	of	forum	to	negotiate	access	to	education	services	globally.	Similarly,	the	CETA	agreement	 has	 been	 concluded,	 like	 the	 TPP.	 However,	 the	 US	 has	 withdrawn	support	 for	 TPP	 with	 the	 election	 of	 Donald	 Trump,	 whilst	 all	 of	 the	 current	agreements	 that	 have	 been	 ratified	 in	 2016/2017.	 are	 yet	 	 to	 be	 ratified	 by	 the	various	Member	State’s	governments.	 	There	 is	a	great	deal	at	stake	for	 investors,	and	a	great	deal	to	lose	regarding	making	global	education	markets	for	those	with	an	interest	in	making	a	profit.		With	a	visible	return	to	hardening	national	boundaries,	and	next	steps	in	the	effort	to	secure	global	education	markets	might	well	be	 tricky	work.	But	with	economic	development	tied	to	the	creation	of	services	sectors	for	the	West,	it	is	difficult	to	see	any	 winding	 back	 from	 efforts	 to	 cognitively	 reorient	 actors	 to	 making	 global	education	markets.		Where	the	challenges	and	difficulties	will	lie	is	in	bringing	them	inside	 global	 trade	 rules.	 For	 the	moment	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 global	education	 services	 sector	 regulated	 through	 global	 trade	 agreements	 is	 a	 project	that	is	still	to	be	realized.	Or,	put	another	way,	this	new	order	and	its	commonsense	is	yet	to	be	properly	born,	and	an	older	order	is	yet	to	finally	die.	There	is	nothing	inevitable	 the	 creation	 of	 global	 education	 markets.	 After	 all,	 as	 Beckert	 (2016)	points	 out,	 the	 future	 itself	 is	 a	 fiction,	 and	 so	must	 the	 idea	of	 a	 future	of	 global	higher	education	markets.			
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